We analyze nonlinear pricing with …nite information. A seller o¤ers a menu to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. The menu is limited to o¤ering a …nite number of choices representing a …nite communication capacity between buyer and seller.
Introduction
The theory of mechanism design addresses a wide set of questions, ranging from the design of markets and exchanges to the design of constitutions and political institutions. A central result in the theory of mechanism design is the "revelation principle"which establishes that if an allocation can be implemented incentive compatible in any mechanism, then it can be truthfully implemented in the direct revelation mechanism, where every agent reports his private information, his type, truthfully. Yet, when the amount of private information (the type space) of the agents is large, the direct revelation mechanism requires the agents to have abundant capacity to communicate with the principal, and the principal to have abundant capacity to process information. By contrast, the objective of this paper is to study the performance of optimal mechanisms, when the agents can communicate only limited information and/or when the principal can process only limited information. We pursue the analysis in the context of a representative, but suitably tractable, mechanism design environment, namely the canonical problem of nonlinear pricing. Here the principal, the seller, is o¤ering a variety of choices to the agent, the buyer, who has private information about his willingness-to-pay (preference or type) for the product.
The distinct point of view, relative to the seminal analysis by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984) , resides in the fact that the information conveyed by the agents, and subsequently the menu of possible choices o¤ered by the seller, is …nite, rather than uncountable as in the earlier analysis. The limits to information may arise for various, direct or indirect, reasons. On the demand side, it may be too di¢ cult or too complex for the buyer to communicate his exact preferences and resulting willingness to pay to the seller.
On the supply side, it may be too time-consuming for the seller to process the …ne detail of the consumer's preferences, or to identify the consumer's preferences across many goods with close attributes and only subtle di¤erences.
Our analysis adopts a linear-quadratic speci…cation (analogous to that of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984) ) in which the consumer's gross utility is the product of his willingness-to-pay (his type ) and the consumed quantity (or quality) q of the product, whereas the cost of production is quadratic in the quantity (quality). For this important case, we reveal an interesting connection between the problem of optimal nonlinear pricing with limited information to the problem of optimally quantizing a source signal by using a …nite number of representation levels in information theory. In our setting, the socially e¢ cient quantity (quality) q for a customer should be equated to his valuation if a continuum of choices were available. In the case where a …nite number of choices are accessible, q can take on only some values. If we see as the source signal and q as the representation level, then the total social welfare can be written in terms of the mean square error between the source signal and the representation signal. Given this, the social welfare maximization problem can be characterized by the Lloyd-Max optimality conditions, a wellestablished result in the theory of quantization. Furthermore, we can extend the analysis to the revenue maximization problem, after replacing the customer's true valuation by the corresponding virtual valuation. We estimate the welfare and revenue loss resulting from the use of a …nite n-item menu (relative to the continuum menu). In particular, we characterize the rate of convergence for the welfare and revenue loss as a function of n. We examine this problem …rst for a given distribution on the customer's type, and then over all possible type distributions with …nite support. We establish that the maximum welfare loss and the maximum revenue loss shrink towards zero at the rate proportional to 1=n 2 . To our best knowledge, this is the …rst time that quantization theory has been applied to solve the problem of mechanism design with limited information in economics.
Our approach extends naturally, via vector quantization, to the multi-dimensional nonlinear pricing problem where the seller is o¤ering a variety of heterogeneous products to the buyer who has private information about his preferences (types) for these products characterized by a vector. Under the linear-quadratic speci…cation in multiple dimensions, if we view the private information (the preference or type vector) as the signal vector and his choice (quantity or quality vector) as the representation vector, the social welfare maximization problem and the revenue maximization problem can be characterized by the Lloyd-Max optimality conditions for vector quantization. We estimate the welfare and revenue loss resulting from the use of d-dimensional …nite menu with n choices. We establish an upper bound on the welfare loss and the revenue loss by using repeated scalar quantization where we simply partition the type space with orthotopes (Cartesian product of intervals in multiple dimensions), and treat each dimension independently. However, this method is not consistent with the Lloyd-Max conditions in general, and thus is not optimal. Lookabaugh and Gray (1989) provided a signi…cant decomposition theorem, which indicates that we can considerably improve the upper bound by using more subtle vector quantization methods to design the multi-product …nite menus over the entire type space. This improvement re-sults from the vector quantization gain which consists of three components: space-…lling advantage, shape advantage, and dependence advantage. Most notably, even in the extreme case when the types are distributed independently and uniformly across all dimensions, the vector quantization method can still reduce the welfare loss and the revenue loss, due to the space-…lling advantage. This is the main reason why we bundle the consumer's preferences over multiple goods as a vector, instead of viewing them separately as independent types.
We then establish the vector-quantization-based upper bound and the lower bounds on the welfare loss and the revenue loss.
The role of limited information in mechanism design has recently attracted increased attention. McAfee (2002) phrases the priority rationing problem as a two-sided matching problem (between consumer and services) and shows that a binary priority contract ("coarse matching") can already achieve at least half of the social welfare that could be generated by a continuum of priorities. Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Ozdenoren (2010) extend the matching analysis and explicitly consider monetary transfers between the agents. In particular, they present lower bounds on the revenue which can be achieved with speci…c, not necessarily optimal, binary contracts. By contrast, Madarasz and Prat (2010) suggest a speci…c allocation, the "pro…t-participation" mechanism to establish approximation results, rather than …nite optimality results, in the nonlinear pricing environment. While the above contributions are concerned with single agent environments, there have been a number of contributions to multi-agent mechanisms, speci…cally single-item auctions among many bidders. Blumrosen, Nisan, and Segal (2007) consider the e¤ect of restricted communication in auctions with either two agents or binary messages for every agent. Kos (2012) generalizes the analysis by allowing for a …nite number of messages and agents. In turn, their equilibrium characterization in terms of partitions shares features with the optimal information structures in auctions as derived by Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) .
Closer to our approach is Wilson (1989) which considers the impact of a …nite number of priority classes on the e¢ cient rationing of services. His analysis is less concerned with the optimal priority ranking for a given …nite class, and more with the approximation properties of the …nite priority classes. Wilson (1989) showed that the social welfare loss due to the use of a …nite number of priority classes converges to zero at a rate no faster than 1=n 2 , where n is the number of classes. The analysis in Wilson (1989) , however, is limited to one-dimensional social welfare maximization, and is not easily generalizable to the multi-dimensional social welfare maximization problem or the revenue maximization problem. The latter problems have remained open in general. In earlier and preliminary work, Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and Yeh (2012a) , we suggested the use of the quantization technique to obtain upper and lower bounds on worst-case welfare and revenue loss. In an extension, Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and Yeh (2012b) , we suggested that the welfare analysis may extend to the multi-dimensional welfare maximization problem. The present contribution represents the …rst systematic and comprehensive solution to these problems in many dimensions.
Even in the absence of communication constraints, the multi-dimensional mechanism design does not represent a trivial generalization of its one-dimensional counterpart. In many environments of interest, the preference of an individual agent cannot be summarized by a mere scalar but is more suitably represented as a vector. A real-life example would be a customer who has to make his choices in a supermarket where a large variety of commodities are available. Hence, designing a smart pricing strategy (e.g., product bundling by o¤ering a combination of several distinct products for joint sale rather than selling each item separately)
is of …rst-order concern in practice. In this respect, Wilson (1993) and Armstrong (1996) are two notable early contributions with explicit solutions to speci…c multi-dimensional screening problems. Rochet and Chone (1998) developed a systematic approach, coined the dual approach, to a general class of environments and pointed to the prevalence of bunching (agents with di¤erent type pro…le making the same choices). We refer readers to Rochet and Stole (2003) for a detailed survey of multi-dimensional screening problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the basic nonlinear pricing model in the next section. In Section 3 and 4, we establish the link to the quantization problem in information theory. With this perspective, we introduce the Lloyd-Max conditions that the optimal …nite menu have to satisfy. By designing a sequence of speci…c menus, we estimate the convergence rate of the losses due to information constraints in …nite menus. In Section 5, we generalize our approach to the multi-product environment. Using the repeated scalar quantization method, we provide an upper bound which is helpful for estimating the convergence rate of the losses. We then introduce the vector quantization gain and the decomposition theorem, and derive the vector-quantization-based upper bound and the lower bounds on the losses. We present some examples to illustrate the bene…t of the multi-product pricing. In Section 6, we conclude with a brief summary and some open issues for our future research.
Model
We consider a monopolist facing a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. Each consumer is characterized by a quasi-linear utility function:
where q is the quantity (or quality) of his consumption purchased from the monopolist, measures his particular taste for this good (called his "type"), and t is the monetary transfer.
The monopoly seller o¤ers q units of the product at a cost c (q), resulting in the revenue
We assume that @u=@q > 0; @u=@ > 0 and @ 2 u=@q@ > 0. The distribution function of is given by F with the support 0; , where 0 < 1. It is assumed that F is commonly known and that has …nite …rst and second moments:
Throughout the paper, we assume that:
i.e., a multiplicative, separable utility and a quadratic cost function. This setting, usually called the linear-quadratic model, has been extensively used in the literature (see Mussa and Rosen (1978) ). In this case, the type represents the willingness to pay for an additional unit of the object. With the quadratic cost function, the socially e¢ cient quantity (quality) for a consumer is equal to willingness to pay, his type .
Welfare Maximization
We …rst consider the social welfare maximization problem. In the presence of private information, it is well known that the socially e¢ cient allocation can be implemented by a direct mechanism (q ( ) ; t ( )), where the transfers t ( ) represent the (social) cost of providing the object. Thus, in the e¢ cient direct mechanism, the consumers are o¤ered a menu
] in which the consumer with type is allocated the quantity (quality) q ( ).
This e¢ cient mechanism, as a special case of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism, satis…es two sets of constraints, namely the individual rationality (or participation) constraint:
q ( ) t ( ) 0, for all 2 0; , and the incentive constraint:
for all ; 0 2 0; . The participation constraint guarantees that the buyer receives a nonnegative net utility from his choice, and the incentive constraints account for the fact that is private information to the buyer, and hence the revelation of the information is required to be incentive compatible.
The expected social welfare is de…ned by the sum of the customer's net utility and the seller's revenue:
It follows that for a consumer with type , it is socially optimal to provide a production level equal to his type:
The resulting maximized social welfare is given by:
The optimal menu thus requires an in…nity, a continuum, of reports 2 0; and a corresponding continuum of allocations, hence our de…nition for SW (1). By contrast, we are interested in …nding the optimal menu when each buyer can communicate his type only in a …nite language, or equivalently, when the seller can process only …nitely many di¤erent messages, or equivalently, when the seller can produce only …nitely many alternative versions of his product.
n-Item Menu
Thus we consider the optimal design of a …nite menu. The menu is composed of n < 1 di¤erent allocations fq k g ; k = 1; : : : ; n, where q k is the quantity (quality) of the k th item of the menu. Let A consumer with type 2 A k selects q ( ) = q k . fA k ; q k g n k=1 describes a …nite menu (and its associated assignment), called an n-item menu henceforth. Let M F be the set of all n-item menus for a given distribution F :
We wish to choose a …nite menu from M F to maximize the expected social welfare:
Since the distribution function F of is known, maximizing the expected social welfare in (2) is equivalent to minimizing
The key to our approach is the realization that if we view as a continuous signal which must be represented by a representation point q k in the interval A k , then this is an instance of the quantization problem in information theory, where the intervals fA k g n k=1 and the corresponding representation points fq k g n k=1 are jointly chosen to minimize the mean square error (MSE):
Thus we may view any …nite menu fA k ; q k g n k=1 as the solution to a scalar quantization problem. Henceforth, we use the terms quantizer and …nite menu interchangeably.
Scalar Quantizer
It is well known that the optimal scalar quantizer or …nite menu fA k ; q k g n k=1 must satisfy the following Lloyd-Max conditions (see Chapter 6.2, Gersho and Gray (2007) ).
Theorem 1 (Lloyd-Max Optimality Conditions)
The optimal n-item menu fA k ; q k g n k=1 ; A k = k 1 ; k , which maximizes the social welfare de…ned in (2) must satisfy:
where 0 = 0 and n = .
Thus, k , which separates two neighboring intervals A k and A k+1 , must be the arithmetic average of q k and q k+1 . At the same time, q k , the representation level for the interval A k = k 1 ; k , must be the conditional mean for given that falls in this interval.
We now consider the optimal scalar quantization for the uniform distribution as an example to illustrate how the Lloyd-Max conditions are used to obtain the optimal …nite menu.
The resulting boundary points f k g n k=0 as well as the representation points fq k g n k=0 share the uniformity with the underlying distribution of the values.
Corollary 1 (Optimal Finite Menu for Uniform Distribution)
With a uniform distribution of types,
: : : ; n;
To obtain Corollary 1, note that the conditional mean in any interval A k is clearly given
From Theorem 1, the optimal menu fA k ; q k g n k=1 must satisfy:
2 ; k = 1; : : : ; n 1;
Hence, k+1 2 k + k 1 = 0. Note that 0 = 0; n = 1, and thus we have a unique solution to the Lloyd-Max conditions, which must be optimal: k = k n ; k = 1; : : : ; n 1;
and thus
n ; k = 1; : : : ; n:
For certain simple distributions (e.g., the uniform distribution and simple discrete distributions), it is possible to obtain the closed form of the optimal …nite menus from the Lloyd-Max conditions. For general distributions, closed form solutions are often di¢ cult to obtain. On the other hand, Lloyd-Max conditions imply a useful iterative algorithm for searching for the optimal menu fA k ; q k g n k=1 (see Chapter 6.2, Gersho and Gray (2007)).
Welfare Loss of n-Item Menu
We are interested in how well the optimal n-item menu fA k ; q k g n k=1 can approximate the performance of the optimal continuous menu fq ( )g 2[0; ] as measured by the welfare loss SW (1) SW (n).
De…nition 1 (Welfare Loss)
For a given distribution function F , the welfare loss induced by the optimal n-item menu, relative the optimal continuous menu, is de…ned by:
It is easy to see that a tight lower bound on the welfare loss over all distributions is zero, i.e. inf F L (F ; n) = 0. This can be achieved by the discrete uniform distribution,
In what follows, we will focus on the upper bound on the welfare loss over all distributions with …nite support, which we normalize without loss of generality to be [0; 1]. Thus, let F be the set of all distribution functions on [0; 1]. Our main task is to estimate the worst-case behavior of the welfare loss over all distributions F 2 F.
De…nition 2 (Maximum Welfare Loss)
The maximum welfare loss induced by the optimal n-item menu over all distribution function
Before we discuss the general case, we …rst consider the uniform distribution, for which the welfare loss can be exactly established, and a fortiori the resulting convergence rate as n increases.
Proposition 1 (Welfare Loss for Uniform Distribution)
Proof. By Corollary 1, the optimal n-item menu is characterized by k = k=n; q k = k 1 2 =n, and thus the expected social welfare is
By contrast, the social welfare realized by the optimal continuous menu is SW (1) = 1 2
, which gives us the welfare loss:
A direct calculation of the welfare loss requires the explicit form of the optimal …nite menu, as determined by the Lloyd-Max conditions. In general, however, this is a di¢ cult problem. We therefore design a sequence of …nite menus to obtain an upper bound on the welfare loss. In these menus, the boundary points are uniformly spaced, and the quantities fq k g are consistent with the Lloyd-Max condition (5). This construction allows us to estimate how fast the maximum welfare loss converges to zero as the number of classes n tends to in…nity.
For any F 2 F, the social welfare corresponding to an n-class menu fA k ; q k g n k=1 2 M F is:
By (1),
Therefore, the welfare loss induced by the optimal n-class menu is
where
is the conditional distribution function on the interval
To proceed, we consider a more constrained set of n-class menus:
That is, M 0 F includes all n-class menus fA k ; q k g n k=1 consistent with the optimality condition (5). Note that the optimal menu fA k ; q k g n k=1 lies in M 0 F . Then we can write
To obtain an upper bound on L (F ; n), we develop a key upper bound on the conditional variance of on any given interval.
Proof. Consider the random variable^ =
.
Proposition 2 (Upper Bound on Welfare Loss)
For any F 2 F, and n 1, the welfare loss of the optimal n-item menu L (F ; n) 1=8n 2 .
Proof. For any F 2 F, consider a particular sequence of n-item menus fA 
By Lemma 1, we have
Hence, the welfare loss
which establishes the result.
Combining Proposition 2 with our result in Proposition 1 for the uniform distribution, we see that the maximum welfare loss is of order 1=n 2 .
Proposition 3 (Bounds on Maximum Welfare Loss)
For any n 1, the maximum welfare loss
The upper bound results from Proposition 2.
A version of the one-dimensional social welfare maximization problem in (2) was considered earlier in Wilson (1989) . He obtained an approximate solution to (2) by uniformly quantizing the distribution function of , and by expanding the social welfare on each quantization interval by the Taylor series around zero up to the order of 1=n 3 , where n is the total number of intervals. He also established that the e¢ ciency loss resulting from an n-item menu is of order no more than 1=n
however, is di¢ cult to generalize to higher dimensions, and cannot be easily used to solve the revenue maximization problem.
In contrast to the approach in Wilson (1989) , we establish an underlying connection between the problem of nonlinear pricing with limited information and the quantization problem in information theory. We quantize the type space directly, and introduce the Lloyd-Max conditions that the optimal …nite menu must satisfy. We then choose a speci…c sequence of …nite menus
, where the q 0 k 's are consistent with the LloydMax conditions and the 0 k 's are uniformly spaced, to provide the upper bound on the welfare loss. To our knowledge, we are the …rst to explore the connection between pricing and quantization.
Compared with Wilson (1989) 's technique, our quantization approach is more direct, and has several signi…cant advantages. First, quantization theory provides not only the LloydMax conditions that the optimal …nite menu must satisfy, but also an iterative algorithm to construct an optimal …nite menu. Second, by using quantization theory in the type space directly, we establish a connection between the …nite menu for revenue maximization and that for welfare maximization. This allows us to use similar techniques to prove the convergence rate of the revenue loss. Finally, our approach extends naturally, via the general technique of vector quantization, to the multi-dimensional environment.
Revenue Maximization
We now analyze the problem of revenue maximization. In contrast to the social welfare problem, here, the seller wishes to design a menu fq( ); t( )g 2[0; ] to maximize his expected net revenue, i.e. the di¤erence between the gross revenue that he receives from the buyer minus the cost of providing the demanded quantity (quality):
As before, the contract o¤ered has to satisfy two sets of constraints, namely the incentive constraints and the individual rationality (or participation) constraints. As usual, we can use the incentive constraints to eliminate the transfers and rewrite the problem in terms of the allocation alone. The revenue maximization problem can therefore be transformed into a welfare maximization problem (without incentive constraints) as long as we replace the true valuation of the buyer with the corresponding virtual valuation:
The virtual valuation is below the true valuation, and the inverse of the hazard rate [1 F ( )] =f ( ) accounts for the information rent, the cost of the private information, as perceived by the principal in the optimal mechanism. With this standard transformation of the problem, the expected revenue of the seller (without communication constraints) is:
and the resulting optimal contract exhibits:
We identify the lowest value at which the virtual valuation attains a nonnegative value as , min f j ( ) 0g , and hence the corresponding revenue is
We hasten to add the caveat that the above solution is subject to the requirement that the virtual valuation (7) is monotone. By contrast, if the virtual valuation fails to be monotone, then the optimal solution q ( ) has to display ‡at parts due to the familiar ironing argument of Myerson (1979) . For our analysis, it turns out the critical bounds are established by distributions that generate monotone virtual valuations, see the discussion following Proposition 6, and thus the restriction to monotone or "regular environments"in the words of Myerson (1979) is without loss of generality.
n-Item Menu
The current problem is then identical to the seminal analysis by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984) with the following important exception: the buyer can access only a …nite number of choices due to the limited communication with the seller. Now, a menu of quantity (quality)-price bundles is designed by the monopolistic seller to extract as much pro…t as possible. In a …nite menu, the seller can o¤er only a …nite number of pairs
: : : ; n, represent the partition of 0; with boundary values 1 = 0; n = 1. If 2 A k ; 1 k n, the consumer chooses q ( ) = q k and pays t ( ) = t k . In the revenue maximization setting, the seller will exclude consumers with low type from the market so that 0 is bounded away from zero and is endogenously determined. All consumers whose types are lower than 0 are meant to choose q 0 = 0 and pay t 0 = 0.
Due to the monotonicity of ( ), we can relabel the type directly in terms of the corresponding virtual valuation b :
and de…ne the associated intervals fA k g n k=1 directly in terms of the new variable^ :
where^ k = ( k ); 1 k n. After this change of variable, we de…ne a distribution function G ^ in terms of the original distribution function F ( ) :
Then the revenue of an n-item menu can be written in terms of the virtual type^ :
and the revenue of the optimal n-item menu is given by
where the set of all n-class menus is rewritten as:
The problem is now formally equivalent to the earlier welfare maximization problem (2). As before, we consider the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu in terms of the distribution function F and the number n of allowed items.
De…nition 3 (Revenue Loss)
For a given distribution function F , the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu compared with the optimal continuous menu is:
We denote the revenue loss by b L (F ; n) to emphasize that the relevant random variable is now the virtual valuation b rather than the valuation itself.
De…nition 4 (Maximum Revenue Loss)
The maximum revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu over all F 2 F is:
We brie ‡y describe the optimal …nite menu for the uniform distribution before investigating general distributions.
Proposition 4 (Uniform Distribution)
With a uniform distribution, U [0; 1], the optimal n-item menu fA k ; q k g n k=0 ; A k = k 1 ; k is:
: : : ; n; q k = 2k 2n + 1 ; k = 0; : : : ; n; and the corresponding revenue loss is:
Proof. In this case, F ( k ) = k ; f ( k ) = 1. From Theorem 1, we know that the optimal menu must satisfy:
; k = 0; : : : ; n 1;
We therefore have the following recursive equation:
This implies that k+1 k = k k 1 = , and thus k = 0 + k k = 0; : : : ; n:
, and q 1 = 1 + 0 1 = 2 0 + 1. Therefore, = 2 0 1. Since n = 1, we have 0 + n = 1. From the above two equations, we have
Therefore, k = n + k + 1 2n + 1 ; k = 0; : : : ; n; q k = 2k 2n + 1 ; k = 0; : : : ; n:
The expected revenue is
The optimal continuous menu is: q ( ) = max f2 1; 0g, and the maximum revenue is:
and it follows that the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu is given as stated
Thus, the convergence rate of the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu for the uniform distribution is of order 1 n 2 , and thus, as expected, identical to the …nding of Proposition 1 for the social welfare maximization environment.
In addition, we …nd that the seller tends to serve fewer consumers as compared to the case when a continuous menu is used: 0 (n) = n+1 2n+1 > 1 2 = 0 (1). The di¤erence 0 (n) 0 (1) shrinks to 0 as n goes to in…nity. This is a consequence of the fact that the seller's ability of extracting revenue is more limited in the case of …nite menus. To compensate, the seller would like to reduce the service coverage in order to pursue higher pro…ts.
Revenue Loss for n-Item Menu
We can now obtain the upper bound on the revenue loss induced by the optimal …nite menus, and then estimate the convergence rate of the maximum revenue loss as the number n of items tends to in…nity. For any n-item menu
2M F , since q 0 = 0 for all^ ^ 0 , the revenue of the seller can be written as:
Recall that the revenue resulting from the optimal continuous menu is:
Therefore, the revenue loss can be written as
As before, when estimating the upper bound on the revenue losses, we restrict our attention to a subset of n-item menus where the second of the Lloyd-Max optimality conditions is
Note that the optimal n-item menu
The …rst term in the square bracket in (11) captures the revenue loss by reducing the service coverage. The second term is similar to the welfare loss L (F ; n) in (6). The only di¤er-ence is the boundary condition^ 0 > 0. Thus, a technique similar to that used in proving Proposition 2 can be adapted to this new formulation, leading to an identical upper bound.
Proposition 5 (Upper Bound on Revenue Loss)
For a given F 2 F, and n 1, the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu b L (F ; n) Hence, for any …xed m 1, the revenue loss
Let m ! 1. Since lim m!1 m = 0, we have b L (F ; n) 1 8n 2 . By Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, the maximum revenue loss converges to zero at a rate proportional to 1 n 2 .
Proposition 6 (Bounds on Maximum Revenue Loss)
For any n 1, the maximum revenue loss b L (n) = 1 n 2 , speci…cally,
We mentioned earlier that the exact solution of the continuous menu problem, see (8), is only valid if the virtual valuation is monotone. If it fails to be monotone, then the solution q ( ) has to display ‡at parts due to the familiar ironing argument of Myerson (1979) , as any incentive compatible allocation has to be monotone in the type . For our analysis below, this has two implications: …rst, in the area where the continuous menu is constant, there is no loss from using a …nite menu; second, in the absence of a monotone virtual valuation, the corresponding revenue is below the solution indicated by (9). This means that the bounds on the revenue losses that we obtain for all the distributions with monotone virtual valuation hold a fortiori for any problem with non-monotone virtual valuation. Thus, the critical distributions for the bounds on the revenue loss are those with monotone virtual valuations, for which the above solution (8) of the continuous problem is exact.
Multi-Dimensional Type Space
In this section, we consider a multi-dimensional version of the nonlinear pricing problem which leads to the design of …nite menus over multiple products. We demonstrate that our quantization view generalizes to the multi-dimensional environment, where the optimal design of …nite menus requires the technique of vector quantization. We present bounds on the welfare and revenue loss arising from the communication constraints. In particular, we
show that in many cases, it is bene…cial to bundle the consumer's preferences over multiple goods as a vector, instead of treating them separately as independent quantities, thereby enabling the true joint design of …nite menus over multiple goods.
Multi-Product Model
We consider a monopolistic …rm facing a continuum of consumers and providing d heterogeneous goods. Each consumer's preferences (types) over these goods is characterized by a T by transferring a payment t (q). We assume that the consumer is characterized by the following quasi-linear utility function:
where = ij d d is a d d matrix which captures the interactions among di¤erent goods.
We assume that ii > 0 for all i so that
It turns out that no further assumptions, such as invertibility, symmetry or positive-de…niteness of , are needed for the analysis which follows. We further assume that the …rm incurs a quadratic cost:
by providing the vector q. Here,
which characterizes the interactions in the production of multiple products. All of its diagonal elements must be positive: ii > 0 for all i. If producing good i raises (reduces) the marginal cost of producing good j, then we set ij = ji > (<) 0. If ij = ji = 0, the technologies for producing good i and j are independent. The seller's revenue is given by:
Standard Form We say that the utility and the cost function have the standard form if
In fact, we can always transform the utility and the cost function into the standard form as follows. We diagonalize the symmetric positivede…nite matrix : = P T P , where = diag ( 1 ; :::; d ), i > 0 is the i-th eigenvalue of , and P is a unitary matrix (i.e., P T P = I d ). Let B = 1=2 P and A = 1=2 P T , where
. Then it is easy to show that A T B = and B T B = . If we introduce the new type vector^ = A and the new quantity (quality) vectorq = Bq, then the consumer's net utility and the cost function can be written in the standard form in terms of^ andq:
Thus, without loss of generality, we focus on the standard form, assuming that = = I d .
Welfare Maximization
With a continuous menu, the social welfare is maximized by solving the d dimensional linear quadratic program:
and it is socially optimal to provide a quantity (quality) vector equal to the type vector:
The maximal social welfare therefore equals:
By contrast, in the presence of information (or communication) constraints, the customers face a …nite menu composed of n < 1 di¤erent items fq k g ; k = 1; : : : ; n. Let fB k g n k=1
represent a partition of the consumer's type space , i.e., B i \ B j = ; if i 6 = j, and [ n k=1 B k = . All consumers with type vector 2 B k will be allocated the kth quantity (quality) vector q k . Now, fB k ; q k g n k=1 describes a …nite multi-product menu, called the n-item menu. As before, let M F be the set of all n-item menus for a given distribution F :
We choose fB k ; q k g n k=1 to maximize the expected social welfare:
Vector Quantizer
When the joint probability distribution of is known, maximizing the social welfare in (13) is equivalent to minimizing
where k k is the Euclidean norm. If we view as the signal vector and q k as the representation vector of in the region B k , then this becomes the d-dimensional n-region vector quantization problem, where the partition fB k g n k=1 and the set of representation points fq k g n k=1 are jointly chosen to minimize the mean square error (MSE):
In this manner, any multi-product …nite menu fB k ; q k g n k=1 can be viewed as a vector quantizer. We can therefore use the two terms "vector quantizer" and "…nite multi-product menu" interchangeably.
As in the one-dimensional case, we investigate how well the optimal n-item menu fB k ; q k g n k=1
can approximate the performance of the optimal continuous menu fq ( )g 2 . We quantify the welfare loss induced by the optimal …nite menu in terms of the joint distribution function F , the number of items n, and the dimension d.
De…nition 5 (Welfare Loss)
For a given joint distribution function F , the welfare loss induced by the optimal n-item menu compared with the optimal continuous menu is:
The welfare loss induced by the optimal n-item menu can be written more explicitly as:
We are interested in the worst-case behavior of the welfare loss over all joint distributions over a d-dimensional support (i.e., the type space) R The maximal welfare loss under the optimal n-item menu over all distributions F 2 F is:
In order to prove an upper bound on the welfare loss, we construct a simple d-dimensional K d -region vector quantizer by combining d independent K-level scalar quantizers, where
. Such a vector quantizer is called a repeated scalar quantizer.
Repeated Scalar Quantization
Given the joint distribution F 2 F, for each type l , 1 l d, consider a K-level scalar quantizer fA l;t ; r l;t g K t=1 2 M F l on [0; 1] where M F l is the set of all scalar quantizers for the marginal distribution F l :
We construct the corresponding
in the type space [0; 1] d as:
One can see that the set of regions fB
are orthotopes, i.e., the Cartesian product of intervals in d dimensions. In the following lemma, we use the repeated scalar quantizer to obtain a simple upper bound on the welfare loss in multiple dimensions.
Lemma 2
For any F 2 F, and K 1, L F ;
, where F l is the marginal distribution function of the type l .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 7 (Upper Bound on Welfare Loss)
For any F 2 F, n 1, d 1, the welfare loss induced by the optimal n-item menu
Proof. Let K = n 1=d . Since n K d , and L ( ; n; ) is a decreasing function of n according to De…nition 5, the welfare loss
where (a) holds because K = n 1=d n 1=d
1.
Repeated scalar quantization does not result in the optimal n-item menu in general. Indeed, in higher dimensions, we can use more subtle vector quantization methods to design better …nite menus. To achieve this, we bundle the consumer's preferences over multiple goods as a vector, instead of viewing them separately as independent choices. In the following, we …rst introduce the Lloyd-Max conditions that the optimal multi-dimensional …nite menu must satisfy. We then discuss the vector quantization gain, and a signi…cant decomposition theorem. We use these results to derive a vector-quantization-based upper bound and lower bound on the welfare loss.
Lloyd-Max Optimality Conditions
As mentioned above, the social welfare maximization problem can be viewed as a d-dimensional n-region vector quantization problem. Therefore, the optimal menu fB k ; q k g n k=1 must satisfy the following Lloyd-Max optimality conditions for vector quantization.
Theorem 2 (Lloyd-Max Conditions (Gersho and Gray (2007) ))
The optimal n-item menu fB k ; q k g n k=1 which maximizes the expected social welfare (13) must satisfy:
In other words, fB k g n k=1 is chosen as a Voronoi partition (a set of the nearest-neighbor regions) with respect to fq k g n k=1 , and q k is chosen as the conditional mean of given that lies in the region B k .
As in the one-dimensional case, it is di¢ cult to get the closed form of the optimal …nite menus from the Lloyd-Max conditions for general distributions. Nevertheless, Lloyd-Max conditions imply a useful algorithm for designing the optimal …nite menu in many dimensions as well (see. Chapter 11.2, Gersho and Gray (2007)).
Vector Quantization Gain
Recall that in Lemma 2, we showed that L F ;
is the welfare loss induced by the optimal d-dimensional K d -item menu, or equivalently the optimal vector quantizer which satis…es the Lloyd-Max conditions in Theorem 2. In con-
is the welfare loss induced by the repeated scalar quantizer, discussed in Section 5:2:2. Lemma 2 implies that we can typically reduce the welfare loss by using true vector quantization rather than repeated scalar quantization to design the …nite menus. The 
De…nition 7 (Vector Quantization Gain for Social Welfare)
The vector quantization gain for social welfare is de…ned by the ratio of the welfare loss induced by the repeated scalar quantizer to the welfare loss induced by the optimal vector quantizer:
To simplify our analysis, we assume from now on that the consumer's preferences over d goods, 1 ; : : : ; d , are identically, but not necessarily independently distributed. Denote by f andf the joint density function and the marginal density function, respectively. Lookabaugh and Gray (1989) showed that, when the number of items per dimension is su¢ ciently large, the vector quantization gain can be decomposed into three terms.
Theorem 3 (Decomposition)
Suppose that the consumer's preferences over d goods are identically distributed. When the number K of items in each dimension becomes su¢ ciently large, the vector quantization gain can be decomposed as follows:
where SF ( , as established by Conway and Sloane (1985) .
Shape Advantage
The shape advantage can be written as
Given the dimension d, the shape advantage depends solely on the marginal density function f . The uniform distribution does not provide any shape advantage, and we can easily verify that S(f ; d) = 1, iff is the uniform density.
Dependence Advantage The dependence advantage can be written as
Given the dimension d, the dependence advantage is determined by both the joint density f and the marginal densityf , and thus implicitly by the correlation among the types 1 ; : : : ; d .
As expected, we can easily verify that there is no dependence advantage for i.i.d. random variables, i.e., DP (f ; f; d) = 1.
Vector-Quantization-Based Upper Bound on Welfare Loss
By taking into account the vector quantization gain, we obtain an upper bound on the welfare loss, called the vector-quantization-based upper bound, which is (asymptotically)
tighter than the bound given in Proposition 7.
Proposition 8 (Vector-Quantization-Based Upper Bound)
Suppose that the consumer's types 1 ; : : : ; d are identically distributed with the joint distribution function F 2 F. When n 1=d is su¢ ciently large,
Proof. Let K = n 1=d approximate the number of items per dimension, andF be the marginal distribution function for each type. When K is su¢ ciently large, the vector
where (a) holds because n K d and (b) holds because K n 1=d
1.
Compared with the upper bound L derived in Proposition 7, the upper bound L V Q di¤ers in several respects. First, the consumer's types over multiple products are assumed to be identically distributed, which is not necessary for L. In addition, unlike the case for L, L V Q depends on the distributions of the types. Finally, L V Q is an asymptotic upper bound on L (F ; n; d) when n 1=d is su¢ ciently large, whereas L is an upper bound for any n 1; d , due to the space-…lling advantage. This example shows that it is bene…cial, especially in high dimensions, to bundle the consumer's preferences over multiple goods as a vector, instead of treating them separately as independent scalar quantities.
Lower Bound on Welfare Loss
From the above discussion, one can see that for the i.i.d. uniform distribution, vector quantization can provide only the space-…lling advantage, which is upper bounded by e 6
. We combine this result with the welfare loss for the uniform distribution in one dimension to obtain a lower bound on the welfare loss in higher dimensions. Proof. LetK = n 1=d approximate the number of items per dimension, andF U be the (marginal) uniform distribution on [0; 1]. WhenK is su¢ ciently large, the vector quantization gain for the social welfare Conway and Sloane (1985) , the space-…lling advantage is SF (d)
. Clearly, S f U ; d = 1, and DP f U ; f U ; d = 1, i.e., there are no shape and dependence advantages for the i.i.d.
Note that L F U ;K = 1 24K 2 by Lemma 1. Thus we have
where (a) holds since n K d and L ( ; n; ) is a decreasing function of n, and (b) holds sincê K n 1=d + 1.
Proposition 7 provides an upper bound on the welfare loss for any joint distribution F 2 F, and Lemma 3 provides a lower bound on the welfare loss for the i.i.d. uniform distribution, which is a lower bound on the maximum welfare loss L (n; d). Hence, we have the following result, which states that the maximal welfare loss induced by the n-item menu converges to zero at a rate proportional to d n 2=d as the number of items n tends to in…nity.
Proposition 9 (Bounds on Maximum Welfare Loss)
If n 1=d is su¢ ciently large, then the maximum welfare loss satis…es:
Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization
We complete our analysis by …nally considering the revenue maximization problem in many dimensions. The problem for the seller in the direct mechanism without communication constraints is given by maximizing
subject to the individual rationality (participation) constraints: T q ( ) t ( ) 0 and the incentive constraints:
+ is the type space. In a seminal contribution, Armstrong (1996) showed that the …rm's revenue can be written as:
The optimal continuous menu satis…es:
where~ = f 2 : h ( ) 0g is the active type space. The maximum revenue can therefore be expressed as:
The …nite version of the revenue maximization problem speci…es a menu which contains n < 1 di¤erent items. Armstrong (1996) already observed that some consumers with low type vectors in the active type space~ will leave the market when a …nite menu is o¤ered.
Thus, there exists a region B 0 ~ , determined endogenously, such that all consumers with 2 B 0 will choose q 0 = 0; t 0 = 0. In this case, fB k ; q k g n k=1 characterizes a multi-product …nite menu, called the n-item menu, and let M F be the set of all n-item menus for a given distribution F :
The seller chooses fB k ; q k g n k=0 to maximize the expected revenue:
De…ne for 2~ = f 2 : h ( ) 0g, the virtual type vector
Let the virtual type space be denoted by^
As in the onedimensional analysis, we can transform the partition fB k g n k=0 of the active type space into a partition
of the virtual type space^ as follows:
In the virtual space, the expected revenue for an n-item menu can be written as:
and the expected revenue of the optimal n-item menu is given as:
where the set of all n-item menus in the virtual type space is given by:
The problem is now formally equivalent to earlier welfare maximization problem (14). We now consider how well the optimal n-item menu can approximate the performance of the optimal continuous menu. That is, we consider the revenue loss in terms of the distribution function F , the number of items n, and the dimension d.
De…nition 8 (Revenue Loss)
For any joint distribution function F , the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu compared with the optimal continuous menu is: 
De…nition 9 (Maximum Revenue Loss)
Bounds on Revenue Loss
Using the connection between the revenue maximization problem and the vector quantization problem, we can obtain upper and lower bounds on the revenue loss, as in the social welfare case. For instance, by using repeated scalar quantization, we obtain the following upper bound on the revenue loss:
Proposition 10 (Upper Bound on Revenue Loss)
For any F 2 F, n 1, d 1, the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu satis…es:
As in the welfare case, we can introduce the vector quantization gain provided by the optimal …nite menu for the seller's revenue. The decomposition result, Theorem 3, naturally also holds for the revenue problem, and thus we obtain the following vector-quantizationbased upper bound on the revenue loss.
Proposition 11 By considering the vector quantization gain speci…cally for the i.i.d. uniform distribution,
we can obtain a lower bound on the revenue loss. We can then show that the maximum revenue loss induced by the n-item menu converges to zero at a rate proportional to d n 2=d as the number of items n tends to in…nity. 
Conclusion
We explored the consequences of economic transactions with limited information within the concrete setting of the nonlinear pricing model. Using the linear-quadratic speci…cation, we relate both social welfare maximization and revenue maximization to the quantization problem in information theory. Using this link, we introduce the Lloyd-Max conditions that the optimal …nite menu for the socially e¢ cient and the revenue-maximizing mechanism must satisfy. In addition, we study the performance of the …nite menus relative to the optimal continuous menu. Our analysis shows that for both social welfare and the seller's revenue, the losses due to the usage of the n-item …nite menu converge to zero at the rate proportional to 1=n 2 .
Based on the information-theoretic approach in the one-dimensional environment, we generalize our results to the multi-product environment. We provide a general upper bound on the losses for both the social welfare and the seller's revenue by using the repeated scalar quantization method. This bound is used to prove that the losses, due to the usage of the d-dimensional n-item …nite menu, converge to zero at the rate proportional to d=n 2=d .
Although such treatment is simple and helpful for estimating the order of the convergence rate of the losses, it ignores some signi…cant features in multi-dimensional mechanism design.
Therefore, we introduce the vector quantization gain and the decomposition theorem, and obtain a vector-quantization-based upper bound and a lower bound on the welfare loss and the revenue loss. The vector-quantization-based upper bound is tighter than the repeated scalar upper bound, and the improvement becomes signi…cant in high dimensions, and/or when the correlation among the consumer's preferences over multiple products exists. This shows that it is bene…cial to bundle the consumer's preferences over multiple goods, and then design the …nite menus jointly in multiple dimensions.
While the nonlinear pricing environment is of interest by itself, it also represents an elementary instance of the general mechanism design environment. The simplicity of the nonlinear pricing problem arises from the fact that it can viewed as a relationship between the principal, here the seller, and a single agent, here the buyer, even in the presence of many buyers. The reason for the simplicity is that the principal does not have to solve allocative externalities. By contrast, in auctions, and other multi-agent allocation problems, the allocation (and hence the relevant information) with respect to a given agent constrains and is constrained by the allocation to the other agents.
Finally, the current analysis focused on limited information, and the ensuing problem of e¢ cient source coding. But clearly, from an information-theoretic as well as economic viewpoint, it is natural to augment the analysis to reliable communication between agent and principal over noisy channels, the problem of channel coding, which we plan to address in future work.
This is true for any set of d independent scalar quantizers fA l;k l ; r l;k l g 
which completes the proof.
